Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. All secret became clear
Decree of the Soviet Government of November 8 (October 26) 1917
“And anyone who hears these words of Mine and does not fulfill them will become like a foolish man who built his house on the sand; and it began to rain, and the rivers poured out, and the winds blew, and lodged upon that house; and he fell, and there was a great fall. ”
Matthew 7: 26, 27
"All secret becomes clear!"
On May 31, 2019, a very important event took place in our country, namely on the fund’s website “Historical memory ”, a document of exceptional importance was finally published - a scanned original of the Non-Aggression Treaty between the USSR and Germany and, most importantly, an additional secret protocol to it. They were provided by the Historical and Documentary Department of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
At the conclusion of the Soviet-German treaty. In the photo, from left to right are: Head of the Legal Department of the German Foreign Ministry Friedrich Gauss, German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop, Secretary of the CPSU (B.) Joseph Stalin, USSR Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov
Why is this so important? In due time V.I. Lenin said very correct words about the state: “It is strong when the masses know everything, they can judge everything and go on everything consciously” (Lenin, Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets. Soch., Vol. XXII. P. 18-19). However, in our history after the 1917 year, we very often encountered (and continue to encounter) such “moments” when the top of the country, vested with power, seemed to follow Lenin’s precepts in words, but in fact acted secretly from the people and hid from it a very important information for him. And there is no information - there is no conscious attitude to these or other events, there is no adequate conscious reaction to them! For example, the very existence of an additional protocol to the well-known Covenant, the Soviet side constantly denied, even when its German copy was published in the West.
But sewed in a bag can not be hidden. Information about the presence of such a protocol in the society leaked, causing rumors, gossip and speculation and undermining the credibility of the government. But it has been proven that it is the information foundation of society that is extremely important for the normal functioning of society, and its shaking leads to serious consequences.
Therefore, let us once again get acquainted with these important documents and look at them with our own eyes. Now it's finally possible! But I would like to begin my story about these documents with a brief introduction on the attitude to the secret diplomacy of our revolutionaries 1917, headed by V.I. Lenin on the very, so to speak, the dawn of Soviet power.
"Bomb of the Soviets"
And it was so that the activity of the Soviet government began not only with decreeing the most important decisions to end the war and the resolution of the agrarian question in Russia, but also with the publication of secret documents of the tsarist and Provisional Government, since the first decree on peace explicitly said about the abolition of secret diplomacy. For some 5 – 6 weeks, seven collections were printed at once, revealing all the backstage activities of the former Russian diplomacy. First, copies of documents were printed in newspapers. Thus, the secret agreement between Japan and Tsarist Russia from 3 July (20 June) 1916 was disclosed, according to which both parties agreed to oppose any third power that would try to penetrate into China. As for the collections, they were printed texts of agreements concluded in 1916 between England, France and the tsarist government ... on the partition of Turkey; on the payment of money to Romania for participation in the war with Germany; military convention between France and Russia 1892 g .; the Russian-English secret treaty and the 1907 convention, the Russian-German treaty, with the signatures of Nicholas II and Wilhelm II, 1905 about a defensive alliance and much more, just as impartial. In total, more than 100 treaties and various other diplomatic documents were published.
In the West, the publication of these secret documents caused an ambiguous reaction. Social democrats and pacifists welcomed it in every way, but the Entente governments kept silence and even tried to accuse the Soviet government of forgery. And how can you not remember the words of the British public figure Arthur Ponsonby, who said: "It would have been better not to make false declarations that inevitably caused us to be accused of hypocrisy." And they also caused what, in particular, when all these collections of documents came to the West and were republished there.
"A very common practice"
However, as one old Russian proverb says, the body is vapid and the memory is forgotten. Already in the 1920-1930 years, all diplomatic practice returned to normal, although in the USSR the memory of the Leninist principles of diplomacy and the negative attitude towards secret diplomacy, of course, remained.
At this time, various countries signed a number of pacts aimed at preventing a new war. It:
• Soviet-French non-aggression pact (1935).
• Non-Aggression Pact between Poland and the Soviet Union (1932).
• Anglo-German Declaration (1938).
• Franco-German Declaration (1938).
• Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and Poland (1934).
• Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and Estonia (1939).
• Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and Latvia (1939).
• Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and the Soviet Union (1939).
• Neutrality Pact between the USSR and Japan (1941).
• Non-Aggression Pact and the peaceful settlement of conflicts between Finland and the Soviet Union (1932).
Germany 28 April 1939 also offered to conclude similar non-aggression treaties in Finland, Denmark, Norway and Sweden. But Sweden, Norway and Finland refused this offer. Thus, to talk about the Soviet-German Pact, as something out of the ordinary, hardly makes sense: it is obvious that in those years it was a common practice.
Here and the Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and the Soviet Union, called the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (by the names of its main signatories), signed on August 23 on 1939, fits perfectly into the general scheme of these agreements. With one single exception ... The fact is that a secret supplementary protocol was attached to it, affecting the interests of a third party without its corresponding notification. It is clear that for a long time its existence and content remained a secret behind seven seals, although rumors about the existence of some additional secret agreements between Germany and the USSR appeared after the signing of this treaty very soon. This was followed by the publication of its text in 1948, in photocopies, and in 1993, in its discovered originals. The USSR denied the very existence of such a document up to the 1989 year.
"Who gives cheaper, so and the best bargaining goes!"
In Soviet historiography, including the memoirs of Marshal Zhukov and aircraft designer Yakovlev, negotiations between the USSR, England and France, which began in April 1939, and in fact preceded the signing of the Soviet-German pact, for a long time were considered only as a “smoke screen” behind which the “bad West” ”And, above all, malicious British, sought to push Germany and the USSR. However, it is known that the United Kingdom was the first to decide to go to an alliance with the USSR on May 24, and Chamberlain, who feared that Germany would be able to pull the USSR over to his side, sent the British ambassador to Moscow the instructions in which he was ordered to give consent to discussion of a mutual aid pact, as well as discussion of a military convention and possible guarantees for those of the states that could be attacked by Germany. At the same time, the Anglo-French project took into account the Soviet proposals made at the April 27 negotiations.
However, on May 31, at the session of the USSR Supreme Council, Molotov criticized Britain and France, who seem to be making concessions, but at the same time do not want to give guarantees to the Baltic states. Therefore, Molotov said that "we do not at all consider it necessary to abandon business ties" with Germany and Italy. That is, a signal was given to all interested parties: who will give the most, with that, they will sign an agreement.
The draft agreement of 27 in May (with the new Soviet amendments already in June of 2) provided for its entry into force in the following circumstances:
- in the case of an attack by a European state (of course, Germany was meant) to one of the signatories to the treaty;
- in the event of a German attack on Belgium, Greece, Turkey, Romania, Poland, Latvia, Estonia or Finland;
- and if one of the contracting parties is involved in a war as a result of the assistance provided at the request of a third country.
1 July, Great Britain and France agreed to give guarantees to the Baltic states as well (which the Soviet representatives insisted on at the talks), and on July 8 they felt that the treaty with the USSR was mostly agreed. Here again followed the new proposals from the USSR, but on July 19 the British government decided to agree to any negotiations, if only to complicate the Soviet-German rapprochement. It was hoped to prolong the negotiations until the autumn, so that Germany, due to weather conditions alone, would not decide to start a war. 23 July was decided to start negotiations of military missions before the signing of a political agreement. But these negotiations were slow because of the lack of trust of the participants to each other.
Meanwhile, on July 1, Moscow offered Germany to prove the seriousness of its approach to improving relations with the USSR by signing a corresponding agreement. 3 July Hitler said "yes", so now it remained only to balance the interests of the parties. 18 July Germany received a list of possible deliveries of products from the USSR, and a month later (17 August) Germany announced that it accepted all the proposals of the USSR and in turn offered to force negotiations, for which Ribbentrop was supposed to come to Moscow. As a result, the seven-point non-aggression pact of August 23 was signed at two in the morning in the Kremlin. There was also a meeting between Ribbentrop and Stalin, at which the latter, according to his personal interpreter V. Pavlov, said that additional agreements are needed for this agreement, about which we will not publish anything anywhere, after which he told him his vision of a future secret protocol on division of areas of mutual interest of the USSR and Germany.
A reception followed with abundant libations in the best traditions of the Russian hospitality with numerous toasts, which lasted until five in the morning. They drank for Hitler, for the German people, in a word, everything was as usual here in Russia, when the horsemen of the nobles and the princes thought that their business burned out. Well, Hitler was extremely pleased with the announcement of the signing of the treaty, since he had long ago decided to attack Poland and his hands for this act of aggression were now completely untied. Well, he gave more, but in the end he received more. In addition, he knew in advance that all this was “not for long”, and if so, whatsoever he did after signing the USSR Pact is only a small temporary “difficulty”. Well, the Soviet-French-British negotiations were then automatically terminated. The USSR found itself an understandable and creditworthy ally, at least for a while. The USSR Supreme Soviet ratified the treaty a week after it was signed, while the presence of a “secret additional protocol” was also hidden from the deputies. And the very next day after its ratification, September 1 1939, Hitler's Germany committed an act of aggression against Poland.
Discussion of the consequences
Well, there were a lot of consequences of the signing of the Covenant, and they were all different, and at different times different consequences played different roles, which made their assessment difficult. There are several points of view on the implications of this Pact, both among Russian and Russian researchers in Russia and abroad. However, it makes sense for the time being to limit ourselves to a purely external review of the events that followed its signing.
Let's start with the statement about him M.I. Kalinin, who declared: “At the moment when it seemed that the aggressor’s hand, as Cheberlelen thought, was already carried over the Soviet Union ... we concluded a pact with Germany”, which “was one of the most brilliant ... acts of our leadership, especially comrade. Stalin. " This statement does not characterize our all-Union headman from the best side, but what else could he say? Another would be even strange ... The fact is that there was no question of any aggression from Germany against the USSR, even in alliance with Poland, the military potential of these two countries was not comparable with the Soviet one. They could not attack the USSR even after the defeat of Poland, or rather, after it, since in the fall it was ahead of the autumn thaw and Russian winter. After the Polish campaign, Germany had only two weeks to bomb, and Tanks T-IV in the Wehrmacht was considered almost piece by piece. It is important to understand the following: it is profitable (and possible) to frighten your people with the threat of war, since frightened people are easier to manage, but the country's leadership itself has no right to fall into the hook of its own propaganda!
Meanwhile, the USSR began not only trade supplies from Germany, but also tried to show it its “good attitude” in the cultural field. The movie “Alexander Nevsky” was released on screens and was removed from the rental, articles about the horrors of the Gestapo were no longer published in newspapers, and “cannibal”, “bloody maniac” and “underdog of Hitler”, as if by magic, became the “führer of the German nation” and “ Chancellor of the German people. " The cartoons on him, of course, immediately disappeared, and Pravda began to accuse France and England of fomenting war and print articles about the starving British workers. A similar turn on 180 degrees, of course, did not go unnoticed by a certain part of Soviet citizens, but the vigilance of the “bodies” was quickly “all those who chatted” sent “where necessary”. But on the other hand, the Soviet people clearly breathed more freely, and this is an indisputable fact.
But at the other end of Eurasia, the signing of the Pact led ... to the fall of the Japanese government cabinet! After all, it was precisely at this time that battles were fought on the Khalkhin-Gol River, and the Japanese hoped for Germany as their ally and partner along the axis of Rome - Berlin - Tokyo. And suddenly Hitler signs a contract with the Russians, even without warning the Japanese! As a result of August 25, 1939 was followed by protest by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Japanese Empire, Arita Hachiro, to Germany’s ambassador to Tokyo over the signing of this treaty. It said that "the agreement on the ... spirit is contrary to the anti-Comintern agreement." But all these were just empty words, because already on August 28, the Japanese government, which was striving for war against the USSR, resigned on August 1939.
The “Liberation March” of 17 of September of 1939 of the year, which completely eliminated (and for the umpteenth time!) Polish statehood and caused direct accusations of the USSR in alliance with Hitler and in military aggression in the West, was extremely ambiguous. On the other hand, the fact that our troops stopped at the Curzon Line, and the annexed territories were formerly part of the Russian Empire, to a certain extent corresponded to the understanding of the situation by the governments of England and France, and therefore remained without any special consequences. The consequences of the Winter War with Finland were more serious: the American embargo, the freezing of Soviet holdings in US banks, and the expulsion of the USSR from the League of Nations should be mentioned here. And nevertheless, even in this there was a certain positive moment, not obvious at this time, but then it played into our hands after the German attack on the USSR.
The fact is that Western propaganda poured dirt on the USSR after this, trying to present him as an ally of Hitler in all his vile deeds, that after 22 June 1941, Germany’s attack on “yesterday’s ally” turned out to be the last stage of moral degradation. In the eyes of the peoples of the whole world, the USSR immediately became a sacrifice of the “vilest aggression”, and the Pact ... immediately became understandable and necessary for everyone to take. That is, world public opinion first turned its back on us, and then sharply - face! But, we emphasize that this all took place even before the “Secret Additional Protocol” became public ...
"Do not bring prices to the temple poland!"
As for the “protocol”, it described the “boundaries of the spheres of interests” of the contracting parties “in the event of a territorial-political reorganization” of the Baltic States and Poland. At the same time, Latvia and Estonia were in the sphere of interests of the USSR, while Lithuania passed over the city of Vilnius (at that time belonged to Poland), and in Poland the border of interests of the parties passed along the Narev, Vistula and San rivers. That is, although it was not stated right there, it was clear what was meant by the phrase “territorial and political reorganization” and it was clear that it could be realized only by war. The same applied to the very important issue of the independence of Poland, according to the text of the protocol, with the consent of the parties, it could “be finally clarified” later. The USSR declared its interest in Bessarabia, and Germany - the absence of such interest. That is, the two countries behind the back of third countries agreed, bashfully bypassing the details, about annexing the territories of several independent countries at once, and this could only be achieved through war. The document did not specify who will start this war and who will end it. It was only about where the victorious armies of the arms».
It turns out that the USSR, which had previously proclaimed the rejection of annexations and secret diplomacy publicly, by necessity ... returned to this "tsarist" policy again, which was in clear contradiction with the theory and practice of Marxist-Leninist doctrine, that is, with the ideology proclaimed and high tribunes, and from the pages of the newspaper "Pravda". That is, if we have no ideology as such, and we proclaim only, so to speak, the primacy of universal human values, then this is one thing, and why not grab on the occasion of an alien land? But if we have at the forefront of the primacy of building a society of social justice, then here we should be an example of everything and ... "not to bring to the church the prices of beasts"!
It is clear that at that time our country probably had no other way out. Without this protocol, Hitler would not have started a war with Poland, we would not have entered Western Ukraine and Belarus, would not have started a war with Finland, but in the end ... world public opinion could not turn in our direction, and we and would be left alone with Germany. But ... it was necessary to disavow this document immediately after the death of Stalin. And after all, the same Khrushchev had a convenient moment for this: the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, the condemnation of the “personality cult”, so what was the cost of bringing this ill-fated protocol here? And everyone, both in the country and abroad, would see in it a worthy return to the Leninist principles of foreign policy, that is, a condemnation of secret diplomacy. But this was not done, and it became a serious foreign policy mistake of the Soviet leadership for many years!
Использованная литература:
1. The Soviet original Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was first published // Lenta.ru. 2 June 2019.
2. A. Pronin. Soviet-German Agreements 1939 of the Year: Origins and Consequences (monograph) // International Historical Journal, No. 11, September-October 2000.
3. B. Khavkin. On the history of publication of Soviet texts of Soviet-German secret documents 1939 — 1941. Forum of the latest Eastern European history and culture. - Russian edition. No. 1, 2007.
4. Doroshenko V.L., Pavlova I.V., Raak R.Ch. No Myth: Stalin's Speech 19 August 1939 // Questions of History, 2005, No. 8.
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